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Abstract. The role of institutional environment in the enforcement of contractual practices is now 
widely documented. What is less recognized is the "composite" nature of the institutional 
environment (beyond the formal/informal dichotomy) and its actual "working". Regarding that 
issue, Mayotte, a French island located in the Indian Ocean, presents quite an illustrative 
situation. At the time of the 1976 referendum, Mayotte decided to remain French contrary to the 
other Comoro Islands, and more recently it chose to fully integrate the French Republic. Whereas 
the Mahoraise society is still strongly governed by African and Muslim institutions, the French 
legal framework has to be reinforced. The confrontation of these legal frameworks –imported civil 
code versus deep-rooted Muslim and custom law- induces an original situation of institutional 
pluralism. The difference in economic wealth between Mayotte and the other Comoro islands also 
induces a massive migration: one third of the population are illegal immigrants, a large number 
of them being involved in outlawed contractual practices in the agricultural sector. This situation 
opens the way to opportunistic behaviors and enforcement problems, as both contractors cannot 
mobilize the French legal framework. The paper disentangles the working of the "composite" 
institutional environment regarding the issue of contractual practice enforcement, including the 
"informal" functioning of the "formal" institutions. The analysis relies on intensive fieldwork 
during 18 months, with an approach that builds on both economic (providing theoretical insights) 
and anthropological (case study and participant observation) traditions. 
JEL codes: D23; 017; Q12; Q15; Z13  
Résumé. Le rôle de l’environnement institutionnel dans l’exécution des pratiques contractuelles 
est largement reconnu. Cependant, peu d’attention a été portée à la nature « composite » de cet 
environnement, au-delà de la dichotomie formelle/informelle, et à son « fonctionnement » effectif. 
C’est précisément pour illustrer cette thématique que Mayotte, une île française de l’Océan 
Indien, fournit un exemple pertinent. Mayotte, qui décida de rester française en 1976 lors du 
référendum d’indépendance et de séparer des îles voisines des Comores, a affirmé récemment sa 
volonté d’intégrer pleinement la République. Ce choix a impliqué le renforcement du cadre légal 
français, celui-ci venant s’ajouter plus que se substituer aux institutions d’origine africaine et 
musulmanes, régulant encore de façon très marquée la société mahoraise. La confrontation de ces 
cadres légaux –un code civil importé versus des règles coutumières et musulmanes très 
prégnantes- induit une situation originale de pluralisme institutionnel. La mise aux normes des 
conditions socio-économiques, réalisée de façon accélérée en vu de la départementalisation, a 
parallèlement accentué les différences de richesses entre Mayotte et îles voisines des Comores. De 
tel écarts ont engendrés un mouvement massif de migration : à présent à Mayotte un tiers de la 
population est situation irrégulière, et un large partie d’entre eux s’emploie illégalement dans le 
secteur agricole. En marge du cadre légal français, ces contrats de travail sont soumis à des 
risques d’opportunisme élevés. Cette contribution met en lumière le rôle de cet environnement 
institutionnel composite dans la garantie des engagements contractuels, en soulignant le jeu 
effectif des institutions, et notamment le jeu « informel » des institutions « formelles ». L’analyse 
repose sur un travail de terrain approfondi (18 mois) et une méthode construite à la fois sur des 
bases économiques (fournissant les intuitions théoriques) et anthropologiques (étude de cas et 
observation participante).  
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1. Introduction  
Although the New Institutional Economics refers largely to the institutional environment (North, 
1990), it is slightly taken into account by the economics of contracts, and especially of agrarian 
contracts. According to Ménard (2001), two issues require more investigation: the 
characterization of the institutional environment ant its effective interaction with contractual 
practices. In order to explore these issues, this text focuses on the relations between the 
institutional environment and the agrarian contractual practices, and more precisely on the 
enforcement of rural labor contracts in Mayotte, a French island in the Indian Ocean1.  
In the general field of contract economics, the importance of the institutional environment varies 
according to the theoretical approach. In the Agency theory approach, using the Principal-Agent 
model, the institutional framework is “dissimulated” but “competent” and “benevolent” 
(Brousseau and Glachant, 2000). Its only role is to enforce the Principal’s commitments. In the 
Transaction cost approach, the agents rely on institutions to reduce transaction costs, with the 
institutional environment playing two roles in contractual practices: it provides agents with basic 
coordination rules that decrease contractual design and negotiation costs, and it makes 
enforcement credible (Brousseau and Glachant, op. cit.). In this field of literature, the analysis 
focuses generally on the formal environment, i.e., the legal and judiciary framework. It is only in 
situations where the State is absent2 or failing3 that enforcement functions of the informal 
environment are actually taking in account. Several enforcement devices are then envisioned. At 
the multilateral level, enforcement devices vary according to the exchange attributes. If the 
relations among the set of contractors are personalized, a coalition system4 secures contractual 
commitments (North, 1990; Greif, 1993; Platteau 1994a, 1994b; Clay, 1997). If they are 
impersonal, implementation of an intra or inter-community institution, such as the merchant law5 
or a local judge, enables opportunism deterrence and deviants' punishment (North, 1990; Milgrom 
et al., 1990; Greif, 1993; Greif, 2002; Platteau 1994 a; Platteau, 1994 b; Platteau, 2000). In the 
literature dealing more specifically with agrarian contracts, the enforcement function of the 
informal environment mainly appears through reputation mechanism in small agrarian 
communities and kinship relations (Ostuka et al., 1992; Sadoulet and De Janvry, 1997). 
Besides enforcement devices rooted in the institutional environment, others6 can be mobilized at 
the bilateral level such as contractual choice (Stiglitz, 1974; Eswaran and Kotwal, 1985; Otsuka et 
al., 1992; Deininger and Feder, 2001; Allan and Lueck, 2002); establishment of interlinked 
contracts (Bardhan, 1980; Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1984; Otsuka et al., 1992; Ensminger 
1996; Sadoulet et al., 1997); screening of partners (Newberry and Stiglitz, 1979;  Hallagan, 1978); 
and contract renewal in a repeated game perspective (North, 1990; Greif 1993; Platteau, 2000).  
                                                 
1
 Mayotte is a tiny island of 20 kilometers length over 10 kilometer width, populated by 160 000 inhabitants. 
2
 Societies are said primitive, pre-capitalist or pre-modern (Platteau, 1994, 2000; North, 2000). 
3
 The State is considered to be failing due to lack of resources, organizational capacity or good governance 
(corruption). 
4
 Agency relations are regulated by a coalition if: members of a group exchange only among them, the 
establishment of one relation is conditioned by past conducts of potential contractors, and a transmission-
information system allows identifying cheaters and releasing sanction. 
5
 System developed during the late medieval allowing contract enforcement despite the fact that exchanges were 
impersonal by supplying appropriated information and generating appropriated incentives. 
6
 Beyond the monitoring of the partner’s actions. 
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The case of Mayotte brings to light an original situation regarding the interactions between the 
institutional environment and agrarian contractual practices due first, to a composite institutional 
environment mixing French Republic institutions and institutions usually described in the context 
of developing countries; and second, to the atypical contractors’ situation, contractual practices 
involving illegal migrants. 
After one century of colonization, Mayotte was the only island of the Comoro archipelago1 where 
the population positively voted, in 1976, to remain French. This choice, strengthened by the 
popular will to become a “department”2, implied the reinforcement of the French legal framework 
and its institutions, present but not really effective during the colonization. In this context of 
institutional transition3, the island has to bring up economic, social, and legal conditions to 
metropolitan standards. These changes are reflected in the now full prevalence of the French legal 
system (concerning justice, personnal rights, and marriage regulated before by Koranic law), the 
upgrading of labor regulation (including minimum wage) and taxation, the introduction of welfare 
policies4, and the dramatic development of education system and health services. However the 
Mahorais society is still largely governed by institutions of Muslim and African origins (Koranic 
law, macadi5, mafundi6, kinship relations, extended family, age sets, elder groups, reciprocity 
principles), which still regulate a major part of economical, social, and political relations. A 
system of rights and obligations – mainly based on the reciprocity principle – fosters family and 
village membership, under the social supervision of family chiefs, chiefs of age sets, elders, 
mafundi and macadi. The coexistence of these republican and customary/religious institutional 
frameworks creates an original situation of institutional pluralism.  
This change of status, generating huge economical and social development (rising living 
standards, massive creation of employment and implementation of public services), has 
transformed the island in a real “El Dorado” for the neighboring Comoro Islands, and induced 
massive migrations, mostly illegal. Illegal people (around 50 000 people) represent now more 
than one third of the island population. Constituting a huge pool of low cost labor to draw on, they 
look for a job in different sectors, notably in agriculture. Lots of Mahorais households employ 
them in order to keep their agricultural activity7, source of products intended to insure self-
consumption, solidarity networks or, more marginally, food markets8.  
                                                 
1
 The other islands preferred independence and established the Muslim Republic of Comoros. 
2
 If people vote for it and if the conditions are filled, Mayotte will become a "department" in 2010. 
3
 Before 1976, Mayotte and the other Comoro Islands had the status of “Territoire d’Outre Mer”. This status 
only implied a partial appropriateness to the administrative, juridical, economical, social and political system of 
the metropolitan France and procured a de facto relative autonomy to local people. 
4
 For the moment, only state allowances paid to families with dependant children or to old people are given. In 
the future, if Mayotte becomes a department, allowances for one-parent families, rent allowance or maternity 
allowance (and others) will be awarded. 
5
 Representatives of the Muslim justice.  
6
 Koranic masters, imans. 
7
 The Mahorais crop system is mainly composed of plantain, cassava and pigeon pea. These crops, associated 
with fruit trees (coconut trees, mango trees, lemon trees, etc.), are cultivated by 97% of the households and 
covert more than 80% of the agricultural area (ESAP, 2003). As they are not seasonal, the basic food products 
(plantain and cassava), are gradually harvested.    
8
 Only 32% of the farming households sell or exchange part of their vegetal products, and more than 60% of 
them do it only if they have surplus. One agricultural household out of five breed cattle (generally less than 10 
heads); animals are mainly intended to self-consumption at the time religious events (only 6% of the farming 
household’s declare to sell animal products) (ESAP, 2003). 
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The “market” for labor contracts, illegally established and orally concluded, links two actors’ 
categories clearly differentiated in terms of socio-economical positions and legal status:  (i) the 
Mahorais people (the Mahorais), who are exclusively in the employer position1, own the land, 
have several sources of income (they benefit by state allowance – paid to families with dependant 
children or old people – and employment creation in the formal sector – provided at 75% by the 
“Collectivité Departementale”); (ii) illegal migrants from the Comoros, who are (allowing for 
exceptions) in the employee position, do not own land, lack capital, and know at their arrival few 
people on the island. Furthermore, this market is characterized by a labor supply that is largely 
superior to demand, which confers Mahorais a strong negotiation power over illegal workers.  
This situation raises the enforcement issue. Considering the illegal nature of contractual practices 
involving undocumented migrants, it seems impossible to mobilize the administrative and 
judiciary system in order to secure them. On the opposite, the role of the public authorities 
(gendarmerie2, migration officers, factory inspectors, judges) is to punish the contractors. The 
Comoro people (the Comoriens) who have neither visa nor working permit risk to be escorted 
back to the frontier by the police and to be one of the 10 000 illegal migrants expelled every year. 
The Mahorais employing workers without working permit and without paying them according to 
the legal rate, might be fined and put in jail. Far from contributing to the enforcement of contracts, 
the formal environment impose restrictions, generating potentially supplementary 'indirect 
transaction costs'3 (the cost of dissimulating these practices as well as the cost induced by the 
sanctions in case of public authority control). What about, then, the role of the informal 
environment or bilateral devices in contractual enforcement? In this respect, the main results of 
our study can be stated as follows: 
• Instead of a unique enforcement institution, empirical investigations in Mayotte reveal a 
plurality of enforcement devices: first and foremost the social embeddedness of contractual 
practices, but also formal institutions, and particularly to the informal working of these formal 
institutions. These devices co-exist, complete one another and decrease considerably 
opportunism, even if they do not remove it fully.  
• The social embeddedness of contractual practices can be emphasized at the bilateral as well as 
at the multilateral levels.   
i) Between contractors, the labor transaction comes frequently with exchanges of other services 
(accommodation, food, land loan, non-farming labor). These bundles of transactions cannot be 
systematically categorized as interlinked contracts, in the sense of a device implemented in 
keeping with incentive principle. The analysis of how these multiplex relationships are established 
reveals indeed that the exchanges are based on the culture of gift-giving, the fundamental mode of 
exchange and 'cement' of the Mahoraise society (and more largely of the Comoro society). Thus, 
they induce a strong densification of social ties.  However, being rooted or not on in a 'utilitarian' 
rationale, these multiplex relationships do play an important part in contractual enforcement. 
(ii) Networks constitute a clear support for contractual practices. Although exclusion of the 
cheater cannot be done systematically and therefore cannot totally deter from cheating, these 
                                                 
1
 Some Mahorais people work for other Mahorais people, but essentially in the frame of mutual aid governed by 
gift and counter gift system. 
2
 Police force in countrysides and villages, resorting to the Department of Defense. 
3
 These costs do not surge directly from the bilateral relationships, especially for the illegal people, but are 
nevertheless induced by the transaction for the Mahorais. 
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networks decrease opportunism through reputation mechanism (ex ante, by allowing selecting a 
reliable partner; ex post, by inducing the fulfillment of commitments in order to keep up one’s 
reputation).  
• Contrary to all expectations, the formal environment is sometimes mobilized to solve a 
dispute between an employer and an employee, even though contractual practices infringe the 
labor code and involve illegal migrants. The analysis of public institution intervention in 
disputes shows that these institutions do not simply and mechanically implement the formal 
rules. It brings to light instead the “informal” interplay of these “formal” institutions.  
This research is anchored in a comprehensive approach, in the Weberian sense of the word, i.e., in 
an understanding of individuals’ actions in their own perspective, including their perception of the 
options open to them. This comprehensive perspective as well as the research issue - contractual 
practices involving people breaking the law – suggested to give special emphasis to fieldwork. 
The possibility to apply questionnaires on a large-scale basis was excluded; the only way to 
collect reliable data was through case studies and an immersion in the local society (allowing for 
the development of trust relationships and participant observation), in the anthropological 
tradition (Olivier de Sardan, 1995). The data production was realized during two long stays (14 
months in total) of P. Burnod, including learning Shimaoré (the local common language) and 
sharing the everyday life. Repeated interviews were realized with 103 Mahorais and illegal 
migrants, and 51 representatives of different organizations and key-person (“gardes-
champêtres”1, police officer, “gendarmes”, “préfet”2, cadi, mayor, etc.).  
A first part of this text deciphers the contractual practices and specifies the nature of opportunistic 
behavior in the studied context, as perceived by the actors. The second part of the paper presents 
the different enforcement devices mobilized by the actors, at the bilateral level and at the network 
level. The last part, dealing with disputes resolution, reveals the part played by the formal 
environment and the effective conditions of its intervention.  
2. The contractual arena in Mayotte  
In this study, the attention focuses on the different coordination modes enabling access to labor 
force, excluding devices of mutual aid among Mahorais. Four types of arrangements including a 
labor component are distinguished:  
(i) Piecework contracts (shibaroua), for tasks such as clearing, weeding, or planting. The 
salary, negotiated ex ante, depends on the task difficulty and varies from 15 to 150 €. The worker 
is paid once the task completed.  
(ii) Wage labor paid on a monthly basis (mutru ha hazi or "gardié" in local French). The 
laborers, in charge of crop production or animal breeding, are paid each month between 100 and 
150€. Most of them have in addition the right to collect products on the plot (corresponding to the 
dietary need of the worker or his household), or the right to cultivate a plot of land3, and/or 
                                                 
1
 A type of rural policeman contracted at the village level.  
2
 The higher representant of the State at the Departement level. 
3
 Generally, single workers have the right to crop products on the employer’s plot. The loan of a plot intended to 
the plantain-cassava production is more frequent when the relation between the employer and the worker is good 
and when the worker is maried. 
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sometimes an accommodation (authorization to occupy one or to build a precarious, little house 
on the employer’s plot). These contracts are concluded without any specific length1.  
(iii) Sharecropping (risiwanissa – we share). These contracts are practiced for crop production 
(sharing by half the harvest or the plot) as well as for cattle breeding (animals born during the 
contract term are equally shared). 
(iv) Patronage (term used here by convenience – locally “patrons” state “I have an 
Anjouanais2” and the “clients”, “I help one friend”, or “I help the person who put me up”). The 
“patron” lends an accommodation and supplies food to the “client”, who, in return, helps him to 
realize different works, including farming works. The “client” can also have a land loan or the 
right to harvest products on his patron's plot for its own consumption.  
These contractual arrangements bind predominantly Mahorais employers and illegal Comoriens. 
Mutual aid used to be frequent among Mahorais, now changes of the socio-economical 
environment contribute to the employment of foreign and non-domestic labor force. For 
Mahorais, it is indeed not attractive to get a job in the agricultural sector, not only in term of 
opportunity cost but also in term of social valorization - as the monetary payment for a task done 
for a parent or another villager is considered “shameful”. Moreover, children are now sent to 
school (public school in addition to Koranic school) and have then less time to invest in farming.  
These contracts, considered as illegal by the French administration, are concluded without written 
formalization or witness. They bring together actors who are in different legal situation, and in 
contrasted socio-economical positions.  
• The Mahorais employers practice the farm activity in parallel off-farm activities. They 
have therefore several sources of income3, coming from salary employment in the formal sector4, 
handcraft activity and/or family or welfare transfers.  Farming households usually own one to 
three plots, covering a total area included between 0,2 to 2 hectares. A lot of these plots are 
located far from the villages (more than a 45 minute walk). This factor contributes, along with the 
type of tasks, to the employment of extra-household labor. Some tasks are indeed considered as 
hard, or require a daily, even though limited, investment. The employers look for non-permanent 
labor to plant, weed or clear the plantain-cassava plot, or for labor available daily to farm or to 
breed cattle. The same employer can be successively or in parallel involved in several labor 
contracts.  
• Coming predominantly from Anjouan, illegal migrants do by night a 70 kilometers trip to 
join Mayotte, in often overloaded, small motorboat which are little adapted to heavy swell (the 
number of victim is not counted but seems to be high). Each traveler has to pay 100 or 150 € to 
the smuggler, equivalent to one or two teacher salaries in Comoro, or to 7 times the cost of a boat 
trip between Anjouan and Mayotte for people having a visa. Lacking any capital, they arrive in 
Mayotte to meet relatives or friends (usually from the same village) able to put them up or to help 
them to find a job. Men find a job in the building, agricultural or service sectors (taxi drivers, 
house keeper, and night watchman). Women do house tasks or take charge of little shops or of 
                                                 
1
 In average, the workers we met have been employed by the same employer since two and half years. 
2
 An “Anjouanais” is a person native from Anjouan, one of the three Comoro Islands. Most of migrants, and 
especially those who are working in agriculture, come from Anjouan.  
3
 The average income of farming households vary between 1 333 and 10 787 € (Losch and Sourisseau, 2002). 
4
 35% if the farming households have at least one of their members who has a salary job. 
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their family1. In the agricultural sector, workers are almost exclusively males, between 14 and 50 
years old2, single or not. Some illegal migrants work in the agricultural sector while waiting for a 
better paid job in the urban sector; others prefer working in the rural sector, estimating that arrest 
and expulsion risks are lower than in the urban sector.  
Illegally established, these contracts seem to open up the way to opportunistic behavior:  
• From the employers' point of view, the 'classical' problem of labor under-investment is not 
seen as a problem, even if the remote location of some plots and employers' off-farm activities 
raise the potential monitoring cost. This perception can be linked to the conjunction of low 
technical tasks and of limited natural risks3, i.e., to low information asymmetries: in case of poor 
results, the worker's responsibility is considered as straightforward. In the employers' perspective, 
the only real problem of opportunism is the theft of agricultural products or cattle. In the case of 
theft, the employee is regularly the first accused. Among the Mahorais interviewed, 17% of the 
employers state that they suffered, at some point in the past, from theft committed by a worker, 
and 30% supplementary fear such a problem.   
• From the migrant workers' point of view, employers' opportunism (little studied in 
agrarian contract economics) is real. The employer could free himself from his commitment by 
anonymously giving the employee away to the police for him to be expelled from Mayotte. 
Theses denunciations are rare, even though some have been mentioned in the past. Today, the fact 
that someone is undocumented is not enough to justify the police attention – considering the huge 
number of illegal migrant in the island, the gendarmes organize massive operations of control and 
expulsion but do not any longer intervene for isolate individuals, excepted regarding criminal. 
Moreover, the gendarmes make sure now that the migrants are being paid before expelling them. 
The most frequent employers' opportunistic behavior is defaulting on wage payment; 33% of the 
interviewed illegal workers state to have sustained such a loss in some previous contracts (40% 
when taking in account labor contracts in the building sector) and 30% supplementary fear such a 
problem.   
However, it is obvious that even though cheating sometimes happens, contracts are not 
systematically conflictive4. The “market” of rural labor contracts is largely developed and not 
really challenged by opportunistic behavior. Which are then the devices that contribute (globally) 
to secure the contracts, beyond the eventual role of actors’ morality?     
3. Social embeddedness and contractual enforcement  
Considering the two types of opportunism, monitoring is only possible for employers regarding 
the risk of theft. The monitoring cost, even though it might be reduced thanks to information 
transmitted by the neighboring farmers, remains relatively high for isolated plots and employers 
                                                 
1
 Some women come hoping to marry a Mahorais or a Comorien in legal situation. 
2
 70% of illegal people were under 25 years of age when they arrived in Mayotte, at the time of the interviews, 
75% are under 33 years of age. 
3
 Thanks to the tropical humid climate and the insularity, natural risks are low. 
4
 Percentages of actors having suffered, in the past, from opportunism behavior, correspond to the proportion of 
individual having suffered from these practices at least once. These data overestimate the importance of 
opportunism, when taking into account all the contracts in which the interviewed actors have been involved in 
the past. Unfortunately, the percentage of non-respected contracts over all concluded contracts cannot be 
calculated, as we do not have data regarding the latest variable. No correlation appears between the migrants' 
length of stay in Mayotte and the occurrence of contractual problems. 
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involved in off-farm activities. As a consequence, monitoring is not enough to explain the fact 
that a majority of contractors fulfill theirs commitments.  
We know from the economics of contracts that the choice of contractual terms can decrease 
opportunism through incentive effects1. In Mayotte, this factor shows up only regarding the 
preference of some employees for in-kind (sharecropping, patronage) rather than cash payments, 
in order (among other reasons) to avoid the risk of employer's default. However, the contract 
“choice” is usually de facto constrained for the illegal migrants, in need of cash to cover daily 
expenditures (rent, purchase of manufactured food) and in a weak position on the labor market - 
due to a strong desequilibrium between offer and supply, the type of contract is most often chosen 
by the employers. The reduction of opportunism, rather than coming from the choice of contract 
terms, has to be understood in light of a screening process vis-à-vis the reliability of the potential 
partner. 
3.1. Beyond the labor relation: a multiplex bilateral relationship  
The employer frequently grants the wage worker or the migrant with whom he is involved in a 
patronage relation the right to occupy an accommodation (40% of the cases), to share the family 
meals or to harvest products on the patron’s plot (70% of the cases), or to cultivate his own plot 
(40% of the cases). This could be interpreted as interlinked contracts (Bardhan, 1980), 
implemented by employers as enforcement devices – defaulting on labor investments would lead 
to the loss of the advantages provided by the others transactions (Biswanger and Rosenweig, 
1984; Otsuka et al., 1992). 
Without challenging their incentive component, these interlinked arrangements do not seem to be 
implemented explicitly for this aim in the Mahorais context. Regarding the patronage 
relationship, access to an accommodation or food supply often precedes the labor relation. Land 
loan are also possible without compensation in farming labor (20% of the interviewed people). 
The supply of these services, taking place later than the establishment of the labor relation, can 
also come from the development of a friendly relationship, which can evolve towards a formal 
adoption in the family2 ("ufanya udjama" – to forge a kinship relation). The exchange loses its 
market features and monetary payments are then excluded –according to the interviewed people, 
to be paid becomes “shameful” and the close relation induces an obligation of mutual aid. The 
wage worker becomes then the sharecropper and the owner’s “brother”, he has his own plot, 
manages freely his time and help his “brother” in his farming activity. The services supplied are 
here the result of exchanges based on principles that cannot be limited to the contractual register. 
In a perspective that goes beyond the labor relation, these services are indeed granted by 
Mahorais on the basis of reciprocity principle (to a Comorien friend), of principles of a moral 
economy3 (illegal migrant living in precarious situation) or of family solidarity (illegal migrant 
                                                 
1
 Trade-off between incentives and risk-sharing (Stiglitz, 1974; Otsuka et al., 1992; Deininger and Feder, 2001), 
or between different risks of moral hazard, coming from the agent (Allan and Lueck, 2002) or coming from the 
two contractors (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1985). 
2
 There is formalization of the fact that the individuals engage themselves to honor obligations and solidarity 
principles. The adoption can lead to the organization of a ceremony or a public announce.   
3
 The normative devices of the moral economy come from the fact that it exists a consensus in a given (or a 
society): the development of economical process must not challenge the minimal social norms, particularly the 
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adopted in the Mahoraise family or member of the family by alliance1). Thus, the transactions can 
have several meanings, evolve and are multidimensional (Berry, 1993). 
Even though these services are not systemically implemented along the incentive principle, they 
induce a strong densification of the social links, contribute to the establishment of a trustworthy 
relation and decrease de facto opportunism. This relationship is a source of advantages for both 
actors and hence reduces the potential benefits of cheating. It avoids the Mahorais employers a 
new search, and management costs (to show where the plots are and which works have to be 
done). For the illegal migrant willing to stay in Mayotte, access to an accommodation, food 
supply or a plot represents huge advantages considering their precarious situation.  
Another element contributing to explain the usual respect of contracts, and in particular the 
remuneration of the workers, is the importance attached to sorcery practices – interviews with 
Mahorais often refer to cheating employers suffering a spell (and falling from a tree, or 
discovering that their house is haunted house, etc.)2.  
3.2. Network as a support for contractual practices  
If the relations are personalized and are built up in a group characterized by a collective identity3, 
information is not costly (North, 1990; Otsuka et al., 1992; Greif, 1993, 2002; Clay, 1997; 
Platteau, 1994a; Platteau, 2000). The repetitive interaction and the sharing of information related 
to contractors who did not fulfill their commitment allow the identification and exclusion of the 
cheaters (Greif, 1993; Otsuka et al., 1992; Platteau, 1994; Clay, 1997). In the Mahoraise situation, 
the contractors do not belong to such a “rural community”, where each member would be able to 
identify the others and to know their actions; i.e., they cannot secure contracts thanks to a 
coalition system. The contractors do not either belong to two isolated communities assembling 
independently Mahorais and Comoriens. Actors are involved in fact in different networks 
composed of Comoriens, Mahorais, or both, formed at the scale of the neighborhood, the village 
or an agricultural area. These networks are based, to take up Granovetter’s distinction (1973), on 
'strong ties' such as relations among people of the same family, native from the same village (in 
Mayotte or in the Comoro), or living in the same neighborhood4, and also on 'weak ties' such as 
relations among workers employed in a same agricultural area.  
Even though they are not built up for these objectives, these networks, rooted in the density of 
social fabric and in multiplex relations, contribute to the transmission of information regarding 
contractors’ reputation. This reputation is based not only on the respect of the past contractual 
commitment, but also on the social behavior in the village: Mosque attendance, participation to 
daily or festive social events, and respect of code of politeness. They reduce thus the selection 
cost of a 'reliable' partner.  
                                                                                                                                                        
norm according to which each individual has the right to access to means of subsistence for him and his family 
(Scott, 1976). 
1
 The marriages being frequent between Mahorais and Comoriens, the former often welcome the later according 
to family obligations. 
2
 Mahorais use fetish to protect their house, but not their plots. We didn’t have the data to explain that.    
3
 According to the authors, this group can be defined as a closed network, a small community or a 'collectivist' 
society. 
4
 Neighbors or people coming of the same Comorien village give information to illegal migrants. The ties among 
people native of the same village in the Comoro remain strong in Mayotte. 
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• When they look for a laborer, the Mahorais employers exchange information about illegal 
people and reduce thus information search cost concerning the job seeker reputation.  
• Illegal migrants get also information about potential employers. They sometimes accept a 
contract without knowing the reputation of an employer, in order to avoid losing a job 
opportunity. They afterwards ask for information about this employer in order to decide if they 
carry on their contract or not. They obtain this information either by soliciting their friends living 
in the same village as the employer, or by getting information from workers of neighboring plots. 
The partner screening, realized ex post, is facilitated by strong ties guarantee of credible 
information, and weak ties sources of new information (Granovetter, 1973).  
• Employers and employees can also be put in touch thanks to a 'connector': 71% of the 
wage contracts and 42% of the piecework contracts were established this way. The (Mahorais or 
illegal) connector helps economizing on search costs and improves the information quality by 
matching actors via a 'short string' (Degenne and Forsé, 1994). 
Although the networks reduce opportunism risk by encouraging actors to maintain their 
reputation, they cannot fully rule them out. As they stretch over limited areas and are frequently 
renewed (a lot of illegal migrants arrive to Mayotte, move from one village to another, or are 
expelled), the networks cannot systematically or perfectly spread information about the 
contractors’ reliability, and in particular information about people recently arrived in a given 
territory. They are not able to identify a contractor who cheated in the past outside a given 
network. Besides, the absence of coordination among networks prevents from imposing an 
embargo permitting to start negotiations with other litigants in case of dispute (Platteau, 2000). 
These networks are only able to prevent cheaters (Mahorais or illegal contractors) to renew a 
contract with contractors of a given network.  
However, in case of theft on a 'large' scale, village networks composed of Mahorais and illegal 
migrants can violently expel the thief, not only from the local networks, but also from Mayotte: 
after beating him in public, the villagers turn him to the gendarmes in order to expel him from the 
island (cf. infra). In the case of non-remuneration, excluding the employer from the contractual 
game is less obvious, as some illegal migrants, under constraints, accept the first contract 
whatever the employer‘s reputation is.   
4. Dispute settlement and institutional environment  
The analysis of the rules and processes, which govern dispute settlements, allows one to identify 
the relevant dimensions of the institutional environment from the actors’ point of view. Several 
levels of dispute settlement appear, with steps differentiated according to the intervention or not 
of a third-party, and according to the identity and legitimacy of this third-party (Roberts, 1994; 
Lund, 2001). The presentation of these different levels illustrates not only the rule repertory and 
the range of authority mobilized, but also the room for manoeuvre at the actors’ disposal. Two 
situations are explored here: dispute settlement in case of agricultural products or cattle theft, and 
in case of non-remuneration.   
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4.1. From tolerance to sanction  
All thefts do not induce a sanction. The employers display indeed a certain tolerance, providing 
that the theft is realized for 'reasonable' purposes and in 'reasonable' proportions, i.e., (i) if the 
quantity of product taken exceeds the consumption needs of the household’s worker but are 
intended to supply food to the extended family, and not marketed; and (ii) if this quantity is not 
such that the employer does not find any more product to harvest for his family consumption and 
solidarity networks. Employers use several types of justification to explain this tolerance.   In their 
own words, “it is better to have his own thief than the others’ thief”, i.e., it is preferable to see 
disappearing small quantities of products than suffering from large thefts, without the guarantee to 
find another laborer who would be more honest. In another register, some consider “I don’t pay 
him a lot and he has to feed his family”. At least, others in a way excuse this type of behavior, 
admitting that they do not bother to monitor their worker (“If I wanted him to stop stealing I 
should go more often to my plot”) – the cost induced by the moderate opportunism of the worker 
is thus justified by a saving on the monitoring cost. Some employers to justify their own 'moderate 
opportunism' also use the perception of a possible moderate opportunism of their employee: “As 
he cheats me, I don’t pay him all the time”. When the threshold of moderate opportunism is 
exceeded, the employer breaks off the contract (“When I came back, there wasn’t any more 
banana to fill my trunk, I told him to clear off!”). 
When the fault is considered as serious (theft of a large quantity of products or of an animal), the 
exclusion from the contractual game is clearly more drastic: the villagers arrest the thief and the 
youngsters give him a beating on the public place (the task being assigned to the age set 
physically able to sanction), under the control of the eldest. Some illegal migrants, concerned with 
their reputation, can also participate to the sanction execution. Usually, as soon as the bustle 
reaches the village, the garde-champêtre is called and informs the gendarmes, who arrest and 
expel the theft. Some gendarmes, once informed, dawdle on the way, in order to let the villagers 
time to administer the sanction, judging it particularly efficient in a preventive perspective – more 
efficient than the sole expulsion.  
4.2. The informal interplay of the formal institutional environment 
In case of non-remuneration, migrants do not appeal to the local authorities, such as macadi, 
mafundi, the elders or chief of age sets. The actors themselves as well as these authorities consider 
that disputes between villagers and outsiders, or problems relative to market labor relation, do not 
fall within their competence (whereas the elders can criticize, and the members of the age set 
settle punishments, regarding native villagers who do not participate in mutual aid).  
After waiting from a few days to a few weeks, the undocumented migrants who are not paid 
express their concern to their employer. While claiming their wage, some evoke sometimes, in 
veiled terms, the risk for the employer to suffer from a spell. Most often, the litigant mobilizes 
several registers supposedly shared with the employer (Roberts, 1994; Lund, 2001): the register of 
work (“sweat must be rewarded”), of religion (“God will judge you”) or of compassion (“I need 
this money because I have nothing else to live”). Due to internalized nature of the 'sanction' and to 
the diversity in actors’ subjective perceptions, these references to morality, religion, justice or 
sorcery do not lead automatically to the resolution of the dispute. Among the interviewed 
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migrants, only 15% of the complainants succeeded that way; 40% stopped at this step, worrying 
to be perceived as troublemakers or afraid to be given away by the employer to the gendarmes.  
The next step for the migrant is to call for the intervention the employer’s family (generally his 
parents or his wife); not honoring one's debts or taking advantage of a poor (especially if is has a 
family) is socially reproved. The employer’s family can put pressure on him, but cannot force him 
to pay. If this solution works for some, others give up but some resort to the formal institutional 
environment – that time not for mediation, but for a more credible threat.  
Against all expectations given the workers’ illegal status and the expulsion risk incurred, the 
illegal people do indeed appeal to the French public administration (the garde-champêtre and the 
gendarmes). One could state the hypothesis that this is done only when the amount claimed is 
superior to the expulsion cost (i.e., the cost to come back to Mayotte) but in fact, this type of 
complaint seems to be raised due to urgent monetary needs rather than to the amount at stake 
(claimed wages vary from 50 to 1000€).  
The actors' closest authority, the garde-champêtres, normally accepts to help the undocumented 
migrants, legitimizing this help by combining different arguments: “illegal workers mustn’t been 
exploited”, “we are all Muslims” or “I help him because he lives in the village”. In the majority of 
the cases, the garde-champêtre manage to make the employer pays, using the threat to fine him in 
addition to the wages he has to pay (a 348 € fine per illegal employee is specifically implemented 
by the French administration in Mayotte, to fight the employment of undocumented workers on 
the black labor market) or to be brought for trial, the sentence being then a fine of 300 to 3 000 € 
and/or prison sentence from two months to two years1. The gardes-champêtres reach thus, de 
facto, a compromise between the French law and local principles. Through their informal 
intervention, they 'incite' the employer to pay only what was provided for in the arrangement (e.g. 
100 € per month) and not a wage based on the legal rate, and they do not sanction him for 
providing labor to undocumented migrants. Neither do they usually turn the migrant to the 
gendarmerie.  
Other undocumented migrants go to the gendarmerie. The gendarmes, being local or 
metropolitan, commonly accept to help them, here again mobilizing several registers of 
justification: “they worked and they must be paid in accordance to the labor code”, “exploitation 
of illegal people must not be encouraged”, and “they are poor and have a dependent family”. Like 
the gardes-champêtres, the gendarmes summon the employer and threat him to be fined or 
sentenced in case of non-remuneration. If the employer immediately accepts to pay, the sanction 
imposed by the gendarmes is stronger than the one imposed by the gardes-champêtres: the 
employer has not only to fulfill his commitment, but he has to pay the worker in accordance to the 
legal rate, i.e., approximately 500 € by month (5 times more than the illegal market). If the 
employer did not immediately pay, he would have to pay in addition of the wage, an 
administrative fine or/and would be sent to Court. The intervention of the gendarmes does not 
systematically induce the expulsion of the undocumented disputants. Some gendarmes explain 
that they do not expel those “who are not troublemakers; in fact we don’t automatically expel the 
guys, it depends on their profile”; they ask for information the garde-champêtre of the village 
                                                 
1
 Television or radio announces frequently remind people of the fact that to employ illegal migrants or to help 
them to stay in Mayotte is strongly sanctioned. 
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where the complainant lives – “the garde-champêtre knows quite well the people living in the 
village. We ask him who the guy is and if he makes troubles; if he doesn’t hurt anybody, then it is 
not useful to expel him”. (Extract from an interviewed with a metropolitan gendarme). They 
equally emphasize that they do not want to impose more burden on the illegal worker. As stated 
by metropolitan gendarmes, “The young boy [an illegal migrant who came to present a claim] was 
frightened to be expelled. But we, we didn’t expel him. He worked hard during 7 months and he 
didn’t get pay. We are not going to expel him for that. Moreover the expelled migrant “risks to let 
his family here alone and he will end up coming back”. One should not minimize such 
compromise based on justice considerations.  
The informal functioning of the so-called 'formal institutional environment' concerns also labor 
inspectors who help sometimes-illegal workers to get pay. People appeal less to them as they are 
not as well known as the gendarmes (they are few of them and they exclusively work in the 
building sector) and are less accessible (their office is located in the main town of the island and 
they only speak French). Like the gendarmes, they threat employers to be fined and sentenced by 
the Court, and manage to make them pay. Considering that their work is to enforce the labor 
regulation, they do not denounce the illegal workers to the gendarmes: “If they are illegal guys, 
we don’t call the gendarmes. Our role is to make employers pay, our role is not to fill the boat 
[bringing the migrants back to Anjouan] so that they will come back the week after” (Interview 
with a metropolitan labor inspector). 
This informal interplay of formal institutions is thus reflected by an absence of a strict and 
systematic implementation of the formal rules punishing illegal immigration, employment of 
foreigners lacking work permit and the fact to not act in accordance with the labor regulation. 
This distance between the formal rule and its implementation does not come (as it is frequently 
the case in other environments) from corruption practices or from the lack of comprehension of 
rules by actors in charge (an equally frequent situation). This distance comes instead from the 
conscious actors’ choice of a 'bricolage' between these rules, from principles resorting to actors’ 
value system (included metropolitan authorities) and also from a certain pragmatism in a situation 
where the strict implementation of the rule is, de facto, not conceivable – this would mean to 
throw on third of the population out of the island and to destabilize the island economy. 
5. Conclusion  
The agrarian contractual practices in Mayotte, established outside the law and among (a priori) 
strangers, are far from being systematically conflictive. At the bilateral level, the fact that they 
tend to lie within interpersonal and multiplex relations contribute to explain the lack of major 
enforcement problems; contractual practices can only be understood if the 'contract' is considered 
as one dimension of a bundle of relations linking the actors. At the multilateral level, actors’ 
reputation transmission constitutes a device relatively efficient to deter opportunism. Ties are 
therefore multidimensional and reveal the social embeddedness of the contractual practices that 
are kept and develop thank to the strong basis formed by networks. On a very different register, 
one should not ignore the fact that undocumented migrants have not any other alternative. Even 
though they have to endure opportunistic behavior (which is, again, far for systematic), selling 
their labor force is the only way for them to meet their needs.  
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The Mahorais case allows one to get rid of a dualist perspective opposing contexts where the 
State is present and operational, to other situations ('without a State' or with a 'failing' State), 
where only the so-called informal institutional environment intervenes or is supposed to intervene. 
Regarding opportunism prevention as well as the settlement of disputes, we underlined the 
interplay of the social dimension of the coordination (through multiplex relations and networks), 
of the 'informal' institutional environment (through the actors’ value system such as the principles 
of reciprocity or the principles of justice), and the formal institutional environment (the French 
administration) – despite the fact the contractors break the law. In case of dispute, a certain 
gradation can be noticed, actors trying first to solve the problem in their close, social and 
normative environment (principles mobilized in front of the employer, resorting to the employer’s 
family), before appealing to authorities belonging to the formal environment (gardes-champêtres, 
gendarmes), more distant of their daily referential and presenting also more risks for the 
complainant.  
The Mahorais case also permits to escape from a mechanical vision of the working of the 
institutional environment. The informal environment, often grasped in the literature through 
relations in small community (familial, agrarian, or religious one) under the benevolence of the 
head of the village or the family chief, works here fundamentally through the actors’ value 
system, but cannot perfectly enforce the contracts. The 'formal' environment that 'should not' 
intervene due the illegal feature of the practices, does intervene, without a systematic and 
automatic implementation of the legal rules. The distance existing between the written rules and 
their implementation by the public administration highlights the 'informal' interplay of this 
'formal' institutional environment.  
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